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Development of the social brain from age three to
twelve years
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Human adults recruit distinct networks of brain regions to think about the bodies and minds
of others. This study characterizes the development of these networks, and tests for rela-
tionships between neural development and behavioral changes in reasoning about others’
minds (‘theory of mind’, ToM). A large sample of children (n= 122, 3–12 years), and adults
(n= 33), watched a short movie while undergoing fMRI. The movie highlights the characters’
bodily sensations (often pain) and mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions), and is a feasible
experiment for young children. Here we report three main ﬁndings: (1) ToM and pain net-
works are functionally distinct by age 3 years, (2) functional specialization increases
throughout childhood, and (3) functional maturity of each network is related to increasingly
anti-correlated responses between the networks. Furthermore, the most studied milestone in
ToM development, passing explicit false-belief tasks, does not correspond to discontinuities
in the development of the social brain.
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Over the past decade, fMRI research has made signiﬁcantprogress identifying functional divisions of labor withinthe adult social brain1. For example, while many areas of
human cortex show elevated responses while looking at, listening
to, or thinking about other people, studies of these cortical
responses suggest a striking division between regions responding
preferentially to internal states of others’ bodies, versus internal
states of others’ minds2–6. Both bodily sensations, like hunger and
pain, and mental states, like beliefs and desires, are internal states
of other people; both are important for observers’ reasoning about
others’ actions and reactions, to facilitate the observer’s own
prosocial (e.g., helping) or antisocial (e.g., competing) choices. In
spite of these similarities, a robust dissociation between responses
to others’ bodies and minds has been replicated across a wide
range of paradigms: when human adults think about other peo-
ple, our cortical responses are surprisingly dualist7.
An important extension of this work is to study the emergence
of these functionally specialized brain regions during develop-
ment. The current study investigates the developmental origins of
the cortical dissociation between others’ bodies and minds, and
the links between cortical and cognitive changes in children’s
social development.
Although children’s developing understanding of others’ minds
(their ‘theory of mind’ (ToM)) has been studied intensively8, we
know very little about the neural changes that support this
development. One cause of this gap in knowledge is that most
behavioral studies on ToM focus on children younger than 5
years old9,10. For example, one active debate in developmental
psychology concerns children and infants’ ability to reason about
false beliefs11. Children’s ability to explicitly predict or explain
another person’s actions based on her false beliefs has been
interpreted as depending on a conceptual leap occurring around
age 4 years12–14. However, recent measures of spontaneous
looking and helping suggest that even toddlers may be sensitive to
others’ false beliefs15,16. By contrast, fMRI studies of ToM rea-
soning have focused on children older than 5 years old17–23,
adolescents24,25, and adults26–28. Prior neuroimaging studies thus
leave open questions of core interest concerning early stages of
theory of mind development.
Based on theories in developmental psychology, we derive
three predictions for observations in the social brain regions of
young children. First, success on explicit false-belief tasks could
reﬂect an important conceptual leap or discontinuity in ToM
development, as theories of others’ internal states are dramatically
altered by insight into the representational nature of mental
states29,30. According to this view, the division between cortical
responses to others’ bodies versus minds might emerge con-
currently with childrens’ explicit understanding of false beliefs.
Second, success on explicit false-belief tasks could reﬂect devel-
opment in other domain-general brain regions, removing earlier
performance limitations (such as response inhibition and selec-
tion, and production of verbal response)31–33. According to this
view, spontaneous processing of others’ mental states within
domain-speciﬁc regions for ToM might be similar in children
who pass and fail explicit false-belief tasks. Third, success on
explicit false-belief tasks could be a single step in the ongoing
conceptual development of ToM, which begins before—and
continues after–false-belief reasoning34–37. According to this
view, change within ToM brain regions might occur both before
and after children explicitly reason about false-beliefs. Of course,
these predictions only reﬂect a subset of those that could be
derived from each theoretical perspective, and are not mutually
exclusive; reality could include a mixture of these three views.
The present study characterizes development of brain regions
recruited for reasoning about others’ minds and bodies, in a large,
cross-sectional sample of children between the ages of 3–12 years
old. These 122 children and a reference group of 33 adults,
watched a short, animated movie that included events evoking the
mental states and physical sensations of the characters, while
undergoing fMRI. Watching this movie is feasible for young
children—it is short, engaging, and does not require learning a
task. This movie has been validated as activating ToM brain
regions and the pain matrix in adults38. ToM brain regions
include bilateral temporoparietal junction, precuneus, and dorso-,
middle-, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex26–28. The pain
matrix includes brain regions recruited when perceiving the
physical pain and bodily sensations of others: bilateral medial
frontal gyrus, insula, and secondary sensory cortex, and dorsal
anterior middle cingulate cortex39. Within both functional net-
works, individual regions have been implicated with speciﬁc
functions (for example, insula and cingulate cortex for nocicep-
tive pain39, and prefrontal cortex for reasoning about emotions
and preferences40). Here, we collapse across speciﬁc functions,
and operationalize ToM and pain networks as regions recruited
generally for reasoning about others’ internal mental and physical
states, respectively38.
We measured three features of children’s hemodynamic
responses during the movie. First, we conducted inter-region
correlation analyses to test the degree to which ToM and pain
brain regions operate as functionally distinct networks (i.e., high
within-network, and low between-network correlations)41,42.
Because results suggested that networks for ToM and pain are
distinct even in the youngest children, we used the average
response of each network in the next two analyses. Second, we
measured the magnitude of evoked response, in children, to the
events in the movie that evoke peak responses in adults (identiﬁed
by reverse correlation analyses). Third, we measured the func-
tional maturity (i.e., similarity to adults) of each network’s entire
timecourse43. All child participants additionally completed an
assessment of explicit ToM after the scan, to measure overall
theory of mind reasoning, including performance on explicit
false-belief tasks. We tested whether each of the three neural
measures was related to children’s age, to children’s explicit
performance on ToM tasks, and to one another.
We report evidence that ToM and pain networks are func-
tionally distinct by 3 years of age, and become increasingly spe-
cialized between the ages of 3–12 years. Functional maturity of
each network is related to increasingly anti-correlated responses
between the two networks. Finally, we ﬁnd that a distinct neural
response to others’ minds and bodies is present before—and
continues to develop after—children pass explicit false-belief
tasks.
Results
Behavioral results. All children completed a behavioral battery
after completing the fMRI scan, which included a custom-made
explicit ToM task (see Methods)21. 3- to 5-year-old children (n=
65) additionally completed a measure of response inhibition
(Dimensional Change Card Sort task (DCCS)44). Performance on
the ToM task (proportion correct) and DCCS were both posi-
tively correlated with age (ToM (kendall tau correlation test (n=
122)): rk(120)= .66, p < .00001; DCCS (kendall tau correlation
test (n= 64)): rk(62)= .20, p= .049); see Fig. 1a. In the 3-year to
5-year-old subset of children who completed both measures, ToM
and DCCS scores were positively correlated (partial kendall tau
correlation test (n= 64), controlling for age: rk(61)= .19, p
= .03). See Supplementary Table 1 for behavioral data and par-
ticipant demographics.
For 3- to 5-year-old children, an explicit false-belief composite
score was calculated based on responses to six explicit false-belief
questions embedded within the ToM measure; this composite
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measure was used to categorize these children as false-belief
passers (5–6 FB questions correct; n= 30 (15 female)), incon-
sistent performers (3–4 FB questions correct; n= 20 (13 female)),
and false-belief failers (0–2 FB questions correct; n= 15 (6
female)). False-belief task failers and inconsistent performers did
worse on the remaining ToM items than passers (Fail M(s.e.)
= .55(.04), Inc M(s.e.)= .57(.03), Pass M(s.e.)= .75(.02); Tukey
Honest Signiﬁcant Difference (HSD) test of ToM*FB-Group
ANOVA: Pass–Fail: diff= 1.2, p < .00005; Pass-Inc: diff= 1.08, p
< .0001; Inc-Fail: diff= .16, p= .8; Kruskal–Wallis rank sum test
of ToM*FB-Group (for non-normal distributions; 3 groups: Pass
(n= 30), Inc (n= 20), Fail (n= 15)): H(2)= 22.96, p < .0001).
False-belief task failers were on average younger than passers and
inconsistent performers (FailM(s.d.)= 4.1(.56) years; IncM(s.d.)
= 4.8(.73) years; Pass M(s.d.)= 5.2(.70) years; Tukey HSD test of
Age*FB-Group ANOVA: Pass–Fail: diff= 1.4, p < .00001; Inc-
Fail: diff= .83, p= .01; Pass-Inc: diff= .59, p= .047). Similarly,
failers demonstrated worse response inhibition than the other two
groups (DCCS Summary score: Fail M(s.e.)= 1.73(.21), Inc M(s.
e.)= 2.26(.17), Pass M(s.e.)= 2.33(.09); Tukey HSD test of
DCCS*FB-Group ANOVA: Pass–Fail: diff= .88, p= .01; Inc-
Fail: diff= .78, p= .052; Pass-Inc: diff= .1, p= .9;
Kruskal–Wallis rank sum test of DCCS*FB-Group (for non-
normal distributions; 3 groups: Pass (n= 30), Inc (n= 19), Fail
(n= 15)): H(2)= 7.56, p= .02).
Inter-region correlation analysis. Inter-region correlation ana-
lyses reveal the extent to which a group of brain regions operate
as a network with synchronized responses. We conducted inter-
region correlation analyses (see Methods)42, in order to test three
hypotheses about the development of ToM and pain brain
regions: (1) that adults exhibit greater within-network correla-
tions and greater anti-correlations between ToM and pain net-
works, compared to children, (2) that by age 3 years, ToM and
pain brain regions operate as specialized networks with syn-
chronized responses, and (3) that maturity of the within-network
and across-network correlations is related to ToM task perfor-
mance in childhood.
In adults, each network exhibited strong positive correlations
within-network, and strong negative correlations across network
(within-ToM correlation M(s.e.)= .48(.02); within-Pain correla-
tion M(s.e.)= .35(.02); across-network M(s.e.)=−.17(.02);
paired sample two-tailed t-tests (n= 33): within-ToM vs.
across-network: t(32)= 19.1, p < 2.2 × 10−16; within-Pain vs.
across-network: t(32)= 23.2, p < 2.2 × 10−16). See Methods,
Supplementary Fig. 1, and Supplementary Table 2 for details
about the regions of interest.
This pattern of network correlations strengthened substantially
between the ages of 3 and 12 years (Fig. 2; Supplementary Fig. 2
and 3). Among children, within-ToM and within-Pain network
correlations increased signiﬁcantly with age (Spearman partial
correlation test, including motion (number of artifact timepoints)
as a covariate (n= 122): within-ToM: rs(119)= .37, p < .00005;
within-Pain: rs(119)= .28, p= .002). Across-network correlations
decreased signiﬁcantly with age (Spearman partial correlation
test, including motion as a covariate (n= 122): rs(119)=−.35,
p < .0001). Within and across-network correlations were signiﬁ-
cantly greater in adults, compared to children (linear regression
testing for effects of age group and motion on within-ToM
correlation: effect of group (child (n= 122) vs. adult (n= 33)):
b=−.97, t=−5.7, p < 6.2 × 10−8, effect of motion:
b=−.3, t=−4.3, p < .0001; linear regression testing for effects
of age group and motion on within-Pain correlation: effect of
group (child (n= 122) vs. adult (n= 33)): b=−.75, t=−3.8,
p= .0002, effect of motion: b=−.03, t=−.31, p= .8; linear
regression testing for effects of age group and motion on across-
network correlation: effect of group (child (n= 122) vs. adult
(n= 33)): b= 1.26, t= 7.2, p= 2.2 × 10−11, effect of motion:
b= .07, t= .94, p= .4). To ensure that developmental changes in
correlation strength were not driven by various aspects of data
quality (such as improved co-registration with age), we conducted
inter-region correlation analyses on face and scene brain regions
as well as bilateral primary motor and visual cortices; see
Supplementary Fig. 3. These analyses showed that inter-region
correlations in other networks (e.g., the face network and primary
visual areas) do not show age-related change.
Nevertheless, the two networks were already functionally
distinct in the youngest group of children we tested. In 3-year-
old children only (n= 17), both ToM and pain networks had
positive within-network correlations (within-ToM correlation M
(s.e.)= 21(.02); within-Pain correlation M(s.e.)= .23(.02)).
Within-network correlations were higher than the across-
network correlation (paired sample two-tailed t-tests (n= 17):
within-ToM vs. across-network: t(16)= 6.2, p < .00005, within-
Pain vs. across-network: t(16)= 6.9, p < .00001). By contrast,
unlike adults, ToM and pain networks were not anti-correlated in
3 year olds (across-network correlation M(s.e.)= .05(.02)).
However, signiﬁcantly greater within- than across- network
correlations suggests that ToM and pain networks are function-
ally distinct by age 3 years. The strongest within-network
correlations in the 3 year olds were between homologous pairs
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of regions in opposite hemispheres, such as right and left TPJ
(ToM), and the right and left insula (Pain). These strong
correlations, between pairs of regions that are functionally
homologous but physically distant, suggest that even the data
from 3 year old children are of high enough quality to detect
inter-region correlations when they exist; and therefore that
changes with age in other inter-region correlations reﬂect real
changes in the functional relationships between those regions.
However, the functional separation of the two networks was not
fully explained by the strong correlations between bilateral pairs
(Within-non-bilateral-ToM correlation M(s.e.)= .20(.02),
Within-non-bilateral-Pain correlation M(s.e.)= .17(.02); paired
sample two-tailed t-tests (n= 17): within-non-bilateral-ToM vs.
across-network: t(16)= 5.1, p= .0001, within-non-bilateral-Pain
vs. across-network: t(16)= 4.4, p= .0005).
In children, the strength of inter-region correlations within the
ToM network was positively correlated with behavioral perfor-
mance on the ToM battery outside the scanner (Kendall tau
partial correlation test, including motion as a covariate (n= 122):
rk(119)= .23, p= .0002). The anti-correlation of ToM and pain
networks was also correlated with ToM score (Kendall tau partial
correlation test, including motion as a covariate (n= 122):
rk(119)=−.20, p= .001). However, there was no relationship
between within-ToM or across-network correlations and ToM
score when controlling for age in addition to motion (linear
regressions testing for effect ToM score on within-ToM and
across-network correlation, including age and motion as addi-
tional predictors (n= 122): NS effects of ToM score: ts < 1,
p > .3).
We additionally tested for neural differences based on
performance on explicit false-belief questions, among 3- to 5-
year-old children. These questions were a subset of the questions
in the ToM behavioral battery (see Methods). There was a
signiﬁcant difference in within-ToM network correlation between
explicit false-belief task passers and failers (Within-ToM: Passers
M(s.e.)= .29(.02), Failers M(s.e.)= .25(.03); linear regression
testing for effects of FB-Group (pass vs. fail), age, and motion
on within-ToM network correlation: effect of FB-Group (pass (n
= 30) vs. fail (n= 15)): b=−.70, t=−2.06, p= .046, effect of
age: b= .73, t= 4.4, p < .0005, effect of motion: b=−.34, t=
−2.7, p= .009). This group difference becomes marginal when
response inhibition (DCCS summary score) is additionally
included in the regression (effect of FB-Group (pass (n= 30)
vs. fail (n= 15)): b=−.64, t=−1.80, p= .079, effect of age:
b= .74, t= 4.4, p < .0001, effect of motion: b=−.33, t=−2.5,
p= .02, NS effect of DCCS (response inhibition): b=−.08,
t=−.59, p= .56). There was no difference in across-network
correlation between these two groups (Passers M(s.e.)= .04(.02),
Failers M(s.e.)= .03(.03); linear regression testing for effects of
FB-Group (pass vs. fail), age, and motion on across-network
correlation: NS effect of FB-group (pass (n= 30) vs. fail (n= 15)):
b= .51, t= 1.2, p= .23, NS effect of age: b=−.29, t=−1.4,
p= .16, NS effect of motion: b=−.004, t=−.02, p= .98). See
Fig. 3a, b.
Reverse correlation analysis. Reverse correlation analyses are
data-driven analyses used to identify events (>4 s) in a continuous
naturalistic stimulus that evokes reliable positive hemodynamic
responses in the same region across subjects41. Here we ﬁrst use
reverse correlation analyses to identify events that drive activity in
ToM and pain brain regions, and subsequently test for develop-
mental change in the magnitude of response to these events in
children. As a ﬁrst step, we successfully replicated previous results
that responses in the fusiform gyrus are driven by face stimuli41;
see Supplementary Fig. 4. Given these analyses have not yet been
applied to pediatric data, this replication enabled us to be more
conﬁdent in our analysis stream, the use of group regions of
interest (ROIs), as opposed to individually deﬁned ROIs, and the
quality of our fMRI data (especially in young children, using a
relatively short movie).
We applied reverse correlation analyses to the average response
timecourses in the ToM network and pain matrix in adult
participants. Because the inter-region correlation analysis sug-
gested that ToM and pain regions comprise two functionally
distinct networks by age three, we calculated the average
timecourse across ROIs within each network. After identifying
events based on the timecourse data from ToM and pain
networks in adults, we extracted the response magnitude of each
event from all child participants (see Methods). This analysis was
used to determine (1) which events in the movie elicit the highest
responses from ToM and pain regions in adults, (2) whether
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responses in ToM and pain regions in 3-year-old children are
driven by the same events that drive corresponding responses in
adults, and (3) the extent to which the responses to these events
changes with age or ToM development in childhood.
In adults, the reverse correlation analysis produced seven
theory of mind events (68 s total, M(s.d.) length 9.7(4.2) s) and
twelve pain events (86 s total,M(s.d.) length 7.2(4.7)s); see Fig. 4a.
All seven peak ‘mind’ events depict (changes in) the characters’
beliefs, desires, and/or emotions: e.g., Gus is afraid that Peck will
abandon him, Peck is embarrassed when Gus catches him gazing
at another cloud. A majority of the ‘body’ events (8/12) depict the
characters’ physical pain (e.g., Peck being bitten by a crocodile) or
transformations to the body (e.g. electricity changing a ball of
cloud into a ram). The ﬁve events that have the highest response
magnitude in each network in adults are shown in Fig. 4b; see
Supplementary Fig. 5 for all events, Supplementary Table 3 for
full descriptions of these events and timing and duration
information, Supplementary Fig. 6 for a replication in an
independent sample of adults, and Supplementary Fig. 7 for
correspondence between these events and previously used hand-
coded events. The timepoints that exceeded baseline for ToM and
pain networks were almost entirely non-overlapping, with the
exception of a single timepoint (2 s). This timepoint is the last
timepoint of event T05, and the ﬁrst timepoint of event P05; the
response magnitude of both networks is signiﬁcantly above
baseline during this timepoint; see Fig. 4a. This extent of overlap
is signiﬁcantly less than that that would occur by chance (5/1000
random timecourse permutations with the same number and
duration of ToM and Pain events have at most one timepoint of
overlap; p= .005), and is present despite not regressing out a
global signal from the timecourses of each network. See
Supplementary Note 1 for a similar overlap analysis between
face and ToM, and face and pain, events. These results converge
with previous evidence for a similar functional division when
participants read short verbal narratives, or when participants
endogenously shift their attention to bodily versus mentalistic
aspects of one movie or picture2–5,38.
The average timecourse in ToM and pain regions in children
was highly correlated with that of adults (pearson correlation tests
between adult average timecourse and child average timecourse,
TRs 11:168, for each child age bin: ToM: 3yo: r= .28, 4yo: r= .31,
5yo: r= .60, 7yo: r= .72, 8–12yo: r= .82 (all p < .0005; Bonfer-
roni correction for multiple comparisons α= .01, for ﬁve age
bins); Pain: 3yo: r= .60, 4yo: r= .56, 5yo: r= .73, 7yo: r= .83,
8–12yo: r= .89 (all p < 1.0 × 10−13; α= .01); see Supplementary
Table 4). Nevertheless, we observed evidence of developmental
change. Among children, three pain events (P01, P04, P08) and
two ToM events (T01, T02) evoked signiﬁcantly greater responses
with age (spearman partial correlation tests, including motion as
a covariate (n= 122); Pain: p < .002, rss > .29; ToM: p < .0026, rss
> .28; Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons α= .0026,
correcting for 19 events/tests). The two ToM events that showed
greater responses with age are longer events that involve multiple
and more complicated mental states (Supplementary Table 3).
Responses in ToM regions during a third ToM event (T04) were
signiﬁcantly positively correlated with ToM score, controlling for
age and motion (linear regression testing for effects of ToM score,
age, and motion on T04 response magnitude (n= 122): effect of
ToM score: b= .4, t= 2.98, p= .0035, NS effect of age: b=−.14,
t=−.99, p= .32, NS effect of motion: b=−.07, t=−.77, p
= .45; MC α= .007, correcting for 7 ToM events/tests); see
Fig. 1b. Response magnitude during ToM events did not differ
signiﬁcantly between children who pass and fail explicit false-
belief tasks (all p > .08; linear regressions testing for effects of FB-
Group (pass (n= 30) vs. fail (n= 15)), including age and motion
as covariates); see Fig. 3c.
We next examined just the youngest children. As reported
above, the overall timecourse of each network in 3 year olds (n=
17) was highly correlated with the average adult timecourses
(pearson correlation test between adult average timecourse and
average 3 year old timecourse, TRs 11:168: ToM: r= .28 p
= .00046; Pain: r= .60, p < 1.0 × 10−15). Reverse correlation
analysis conducted on the 3 year olds’ data alone identiﬁed 4 of
the 12 pain events and 1 of the 7 ToM events discovered in the
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Cloudy’61
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adult sample. These events correspond to a subset of the
timepoints that were identiﬁed as ToM or pain events in 3 year
olds (Pain: 14/32 s, ToM: 4/8 s). Interestingly, 8 of the remaining
18 s identiﬁed as a pain event in 3-year-old children corresponds
to a ToM event (T04) in adults, and the remaining 4 s identiﬁed
as a ToM event corresponds to a pain event (P01) in adults
(Fig. 4). The remaining 10 s identiﬁed as pain events occurred
immediately after adult pain event timepoints.
Relating functional maturity to inter-region correlations. We
tested whether the functional maturity (i.e., similarity to adults) of
a child’s movie-driven timecourse was related to the inter-region
correlations measuring the child’s network properties. Functional
maturity was quantiﬁed by correlating each child’s timecourse
with the average adult timecourse. We found that the maturity of
the movie-driven timecourse in both ToM and Pain networks was
predicted by the anti-correlation of regions across networks
(linear regressions testing for effects of across-network
correlation, within-network correlation, age, and motion on
functional maturity measure (n= 122): ToM: effect of across-
network correlation: b=−.4, t=−5.5, p= 2.2 × 10−7, NS effect
of within-ToM correlation: b= .1, t= 1.5, p= .14, effect of age:
b= .4, t= 5.3, p= 5.7 × 10−7, NS effect of motion: b=−.1,
t=−1.5, p= .14; Pain: effect of across-network correlation:
b=−.51, t=−7.4, p= 2.8 × 10−11, NS effect of within-Pain
correlation: b= .13, t= 1.9, p= .06, effect of age: b= .3, t= 4.6,
p= 1.3 × 10−5, NS effect of motion: b=−.08, t=−1.3, p= .2);
see Fig. 5.
That is, for children whose regions across the two networks
showed more distinct responses, the average response within each
network to the movie was more adult-like. This same pattern did
not hold for within-network correlations. Greater within-network
correlations were strongly associated with age, but not with
timecourse maturity (linear regressions testing for effects of
timecourse maturity, age, and motion on within-network
correlations (n= 122): ToM: NS effect of functional maturity:
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Fig. 4 Reverse Correlation Analysis. a The average timecourse per age group for the ToM network (top) and Pain matrix (bottom), during viewing of ‘Partly
Cloudy’61. Each timepoint along the x-axis corresponds to a single TR (2 s); the entire movie was 168 TRs (<6min). Shaded blocks show timepoints
identiﬁed as ToM (red) and Pain (green) events in a reverse correlation analysis conducted on adults (n= 33); timepoints within the gray block correspond
to the opening logos of the movie and were not analyzed. Dark red and green borders show timepoints identiﬁed as ToM and pain events, respectively, in
3-year-old children (n= 17). Event labels (e.g., T01, P01) indicate ranking of average magnitude of response in adults. Asterisks indicate signiﬁcant positive
correlations between peak magnitude of response and age (continuous variable; black) and ToM behavioral score (continuous variable; red), after
correcting for multiple comparisons (age: 19 ToM/Pain events, α= .0026; ToM: 7 ToM events, α= .007). b Example frames and descriptions for the ﬁve
events with the highest magnitude of response in adults, per network (see Supplementary Fig. 5 for all events, Supplementary Table 3 for fuller event
descriptions and timing and duration information, and Supplementary Fig. 6 for a replication in an independent sample of adults). Images ©2009 Pixar,
reused with permission. These images are not covered under the CC BY license for this article
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b= .05, t= .48, p= .63, effect of age: b= .3, t= 2.5, p= .01, effect
of motion: b=−.3, t=−3.56, p= .0005; Pain: NS effect of
functional maturity: b= .07, t= .61, p= .55, marginal effect of
age: b= .2, t= 1.96, p= .05, NS effect of motion: b=−.005,
t=−.05, p= .96). Additionally, while having an adult-like ToM
timecourse was positively correlated with ToM behavior (spear-
man partial correlation test, including motion as a covariate (n=
122): rs(119)= .54, p= 1.3 × 10−10), this relationship did not
remain signiﬁcant in a regression including age as an additional
predictor (linear regression testing for effects of age, ToM score,
and motion on functional maturity of ToM timecourse (n= 122):
effect of Age: b= .5, t= 4.2, p < .00005, NS effect of ToM score: b
= .1, t= 1.2, p= .3, effect of motion: b=−.15, t=−2.1, p= .04).
Functional maturity of the ToM timecourse did not differ based
on explicit false-belief task performance (linear regression testing
for effects of FB-Group (pass vs. fail), age, and motion on
functional maturity of ToM timecourse: NS effect of group (pass
(n= 30) vs. fail (n= 15)): b=−.12, t=−.35, p= .73, effect of
age: b= .49, t= 2.9, p= .005, effect of motion: b=−.43,
t=−3.4, p= .002). Thus, among children, having functionally
mature, task-driven responses is predicted by a child’s anti-
correlated responses in regions of the ToM and Pain networks.
Discussion
Children’s brains and their cognitive abilities undergo dramatic
development in early childhood. In social cognition, for example,
young children develop a remarkably sophisticated under-
standing of others’ desires, thoughts and emotions, as distinct
from their bodily reﬂexes, pains, and illnesses; much of this
development occurs before children begin formal schooling at 6
years old45–47. Although brain regions involved in ToM have
been extensively studied in adults, adolescents, and older chil-
dren, fMRI experiments present serious obstacles for very young
children. By using a short, engaging and naturalistic movie sti-
mulus, we were able to collect functional data from a large
sample of children (n= 122), including 65 children between 3
and 6 years of age. The movie stimulus, Pixar’s ‘Partly Cloudy,’
depicts multiple events that focus on two aspects of the main
characters (a cloud named Gus, and his stork friend Peck): their
bodily sensations (often physical pain) and their mental states
(beliefs, desires, and emotions). We measure developmental
change in cortical networks recruited for reasoning about bodies
(the pain matrix) and minds (the theory of mind network), and
relate development in the ToM network to behavioral changes in
theory of mind—bridging the gap between previous fMRI studies
in older children, and a large behavioral literature on early ToM
development.
The ﬁrst goal of this project was to measure developmental
change in the pain matrix and theory of mind network. A key
result emerged from multiple different analysis approaches: a core
aspect of development in the social brain is the differentiation of
spontaneous cortical responses to depictions of others’ bodies
versus minds. First, anti-correlations between the ToM and pain
networks showed particularly dramatic change with age: regions
in these two networks were uncorrelated in 3 year olds, but
robustly anti-correlated in older children and adults. This anti-
correlation predicted the maturity (i.e., similarity to adults) of
each network’s timecourse of response evoked by the movie.
Second, while activity in ToM and pain networks in adults is
driven by non-overlapping mentalistic and bodily events,
respectively, in 3 year olds some events led to increased activity in
the opposite network: the adult pain event P01 elicited activity in
the ToM network, and the adult ToM event T04 elicited activity
in the pain network of 3-year-old children. These results are in
line with previous evidence that functionally selective brain
regions respond less to non-preferred categories with
age,20,21,48,49 and suggest that development of functionally spe-
cialized brain regions for reasoning about others’ internal states
involves increasingly accurate application of speciﬁc neural
resources (i.e., distinct groups of brain regions) to speciﬁc inputs
(events depicting others’ mental states versus physical sensations).
Almost all previous publications of timecourse data in young
children describe analyses of resting state data: fMRI data col-
lected while participants are not performing any particular cog-
nitive task, or in some cases, while participants are asleep50. One
advantage of measuring inter-region correlations during a movie,
as we did here, is that children’s psychological state (e.g., atten-
tion, anxiety, alertness) is likely more similar, across ages. On the
other hand, a disadvantage is that we cannot distinguish between
intrinsic and task-driven contributions to the inter-region cor-
relations51. For example, the development of anti-correlations
between ToM and pain networks may reﬂect a combination of
both intrinsic changes in network structure, and increasing
functional selectivity of the movie-driven response in individual
regions52. Future studies could tease apart contributions of
intrinsic and task-driven connectivity by collecting both resting-
state and functional task data from the same child; however, for
3-year-old children any additional data collection within a session
would be challenging.
The second goal of this project was to ask how change in the
ToM network relates to children’s theory of mind cognitive
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abilities. All children were asked questions about other people’s
actions, beliefs, desires, expectations, and moral blameworthiness.
Within this set of questions, six questions focused speciﬁcally on
predicting and explaining actions based on false beliefs. The
transition from failure to success on the false-belief task has
sometimes been interpreted as evidence of discontinuity in
development around age 4 years: the emergence of a new theory,
or cognitive mechanism, that did not exist earlier12–14. A second
possibility is that changes in executive function (e.g., response
inhibition) unmask children’s previously existing ToM31–33. A
third possibility is that children’s theory of mind itself undergoes
continuous and gradual development, from relatively simple
concepts of perceptions and goals in 2 year olds to a sophisticated
understanding of negligence and irony in early adolescence34–
37,53. Each of these possibilities makes different predictions for
the patterns of neural data we measured here. Unlike any pre-
vious fMRI study of ToM, our sample included a substantial
number of children who systematically failed explicit false-belief
tests. This enabled us to test for signatures of neural responses
that predict improved performance on false-beliefs tasks, in
addition to ToM reasoning more generally.
Our data were most inconsistent with the prediction of a
robust discontinuity in response, associated with the transition
from failure to success on explicit false-belief tasks. In the proﬁles
of neural responses, we saw no major discontinuity when children
begin to systematically pass false-belief tasks. Brain regions
involved in ToM in adulthood already constitute a distinct net-
work in 3-year-old children, which gradually becomes more
integrated and distinct from other networks over the next decade.
Similarly, the timecourse of response in the ToM network in
response to a social movie is strongly positively correlated, even
between 3 year olds and adults. The timecourse and peak event
responses show gradual continuous development over childhood.
Focusing speciﬁcally on 3- to 5-year-old children, the neural
responses to social movies in children who systematically fail
versus pass explicit false-belief tasks were similar: there were no
differences in the magnitude of response to the seven ToM events
identiﬁed using reverse correlation analyses, and no difference in
the extent of anti-correlation of the responses in ToM and pain
networks. Consistent with recent evidence that false-belief passers
have increased structural connectivity between ToM brain
regions, compared to failers54, we ﬁnd that passing false-belief
tasks was associated with increased functional correlations among
regions in the ToM network, but this group difference became
marginal when taking response inhibition abilities into account,
and the same neural measure was also associated with age in the
full sample.
Our data were partially consistent with the prediction that
spontaneous processing of others’ mental states within domain-
speciﬁc regions for ToM is similar, regardless of performance on
explicit false-belief tasks. Research in adults suggests that the
same ToM brain regions are recruited to reason about mental
state content, regardless of whether the stimulus is verbal or
nonverbal, instructed or spontaneous19,38,55,56. Spontaneously
generating mentalistic descriptions of actions is a precursor of
performance on explicit tasks57, and is correlated with cortical
thinning of ToM regions in adults58. In the current study, 3-year-
old children who systematically fail false-belief tasks nevertheless
recruited ToM brain regions at similar times in the movie and as
a distinct network from the pain matrix. On the other hand, we
did observe signiﬁcant change within ToM brain regions, and in
the dissociation between ToM and pain networks, which is not
predicted by the view that explicit ToM tasks measure change in
domain general performance limitations.
Overall, our results seem most consistent with the prediction
that a distinct neural response to others' minds versus bodies is
already beginning to develop well before children explicitly pass
false-belief tasks, and continues to develop well after7,8,47. For
example, for one event in the movie, the magnitude of response in
the ToM network correlated with the child’s score on the full
ToM battery (not limited to false belief items). This event (T04)
shows Peck donning protective football gear in front of Gus. In
context, this event depicts Gus revising previous beliefs and
emotions (because Gus believed that Peck had abandoned him,
Gus had been furious and devastated; once Peck shows Gus the
helmet and pads, Gus realizes that Peck has not abandoned him
and indeed never intended to abandon him, and Gus feels happy
and relieved). Increased activity in ToM regions during this event
may reﬂect children’s improved ability to consider the relevance
of the current event for (past) beliefs or emotions that are not
explicitly depicted59.
These fMRI results are thus consistent with evidence in
developmental psychology for slow, continuous development of
theory of mind. In individual children, the transition from failing
to passing explicit false-belief tasks occurs gradually and noisily:
children who begin to answer explicit false-belief questions cor-
rectly often subsequently fall back to incorrect responses57.
Improvement is boosted by explicit explanatory practice and
feedback over a relatively long period of time. The noisiness of
development is visible in the current dataset: twenty children
answered three or four out of six explicit false-belief questions
correctly, within a single testing session. Also, mastering explicit
false-belief tasks is not equivalent to having a fully mature theory
of mind60; older children are still learning to infer hidden emo-
tions34, discriminate degrees of moral blameworthiness53, and
understand non-literal speech like sarcasm and irony37. On this
view false-belief task performance is likely just one step along a
long trajectory of increasingly sophisticated understanding of
other minds.
In sum, we report evidence that when people spontaneously
watch an animated movie evoking the internal states of others,
distinct networks of cortical regions are recruited for events that
make salient internal states of the mind versus of the body. These
networks are already functionally distinct in 3-year-old children,
but show increasing within-network and decreasing across-
network correlations throughout childhood. The anti-
correlation of the two networks strongly predicts the maturity
of each network, in response to the movie. Speciﬁc peak events
within the movie evoke activity that increases with age, and with
theory of mind reasoning ability. On the other hand, the most
famous milestone in ToM behavioral development, passing
explicit false-belief tasks, does not correspond with a dis-
continuity in the neural basis for reasoning about the minds of
others.
Methods
Participants. One hundred twenty two 3.5–12-year-old children (M(s.d.)= 6.7
(2.3); 64 females) participated in the study. 110 children were right-handed and 3
were ambidextrous (as indicated by parent or legal guardian). This sample includes
65 children under the age of 6 years (M(s.d.)= 4.82(.81) years; 34 females; 54 RH/3
Ambi); this subset of children were used to test for neural differences between
children who pass (n= 30; M(s.d.)= 5.2(.70); 15 females; 26 RH/2 Ambi) and fail
(n= 15; M(s.d.)= 4.08(.56); 6 females; 11 RH/4 LH) false-belief tasks. Twenty
children in this subset responded inconsistently to false-belief tasks (M(s.d.)= 4.75
(.73); 13 female; 17 RH/1 Ambi). An additional 19 children were recruited to
participate and excluded from all analyses for not completing or participating in
the study (n= 12), language delays (n= 2), and excessive motion during the fMRI
scan (n= 5; see fMRI Data Analysis for details). Thirty three adult participants
(ages 18–39 years; M(s.d.)= 24.8(5.3); 20 females; 32 RH/1 LH) additionally
participated in the fMRI portion of the study. Child and adult participants were
recruited from the local community. All adult participants gave written consent;
parent/guardian consent and child assent was received for all child participants.
Recruitment and experiment protocols were approved by the Committee on the
Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES) at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-03399-2
8 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 9:1027 | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-03399-2 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
fMRI stimuli. Participants watched a silent version of ‘Partly Cloudy,’61, a 5.6-min
animated movie38. A short description of the plot can be found online (https://
www.pixar.com/partly-cloudy#partly-cloudy-1). Previous research suggests that
pediatric populations move signiﬁcantly less during fMRI scans using movie sti-
muli62. The stimulus was preceded by 10 s of rest, and participants were instructed
to watch the movie and remain still. Participants aged ﬁve and older completed
additional tasks prior to viewing this stimulus; these tasks largely involved listening
to (children) or reading (adults) stories.
fMRI data acquisition. Prior to the scan, child participants completed a mock scan
in order to become acclimated to the scanner environment and sounds, and to
learn how to stay still. Children were given the option to hold a large stuffed animal
during the fMRI scan in order to feel calm and to prevent ﬁdgeting. An experi-
menter stood by child participants’ feet, near the entrance of the MRI bore, to
ensure that the participant remained awake and attentive to the movie. If this
experimenter noticed participant movement, she placed her hand gently on the
participant’s leg, as a reminder to stay still.
Whole-brain structural and functional MRI data were acquired on a 3-Tesla
Siemens Tim Trio scanner located at the Athinoula A. Martinos Imaging Center at
MIT. Children under age 5 years used one of two custom 32-channel phased-array
head coils made for younger (n= 3, M(s.d.)= 3.91(.42) years) or older (n= 28, M
(s.d.)= 4.07(.42) years) children63; all other participants used the standard Siemens
32-channel head coil. T1-weighted structural images were collected in 176
interleaved sagittal slices with 1 mm isotropic voxels (GRAPPA parallel imaging,
acceleration factor of 3; adult coil: FOV: 256 mm; kid coils: FOV: 192 mm).
Functional data were collected with a gradient-echo EPI sequence sensitive to
Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) contrast in 32 interleaved near-axial slices
aligned with the anterior/posterior commissure, and covering the whole brain (EPI
factor: 64; TR: 2 s, TE: 30 ms, ﬂip angle: 90°). As participants were initially recruited
for different studies, there are small differences in voxel size and slice gaps across
participants (3.13 mm isotropic with no slice gap (n= 5 adults, n= 3 7yos, n= 20
8–12yo); 3.13 mm isotropic with 10% slice gap (n= 28 adults), 3 mm isotropic with
20% slice gap (n= 1 3yo, n= 3 4yo, n= 2 7yo, n= 1 9yo); 3 mm isotropic with
10% slice gap (all remaining participants)); all functional data were subsequently
upsampled in normalized space to 2 mm isotropic voxels. Prospective acquisition
correction was used to adjust the positions of the gradients based on the
participant’s head motion one TR back64. 168 volumes were acquired in each run;
children under age ﬁve completed two functional runs, while older participants
completed only one run. For consistency across participants, only the ﬁrst run of
data was analyzed. Four dummy scans were collected to allow for steady-state
magnetization.
fMRI data analysis. FMRI data were analyzed using SPM8 (http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.
ac.uk/spm)65 and custom software written in Matlab and R. Functional images
were registered to the ﬁrst image of the run; that image was registered to each
participant’s anatomical image, and each participant’s anatomical image was
normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template. This enabled us
to use group regions of interest (ROIs) and hypothesis spaces created in adult data
sets, and to directly compare responses between child and adult participants.
Previous research has suggested that anatomical differences between children as
young as 7 years are small relative to the resolution of fMRI data, which supports
usage of a common space between adults and children of this age (for similar
procedures with children under age seven, see refs 21,66,67; for methodological
considerations, see ref. 68). Registration of each individual’s brain to the MNI
template was visually inspected, including checking the match of the cortical
envelope and internal features like the AC–PC and major sulci. All data were
smoothed using a Gaussian ﬁlter (5 mm kernel).
Artifact timepoints were identiﬁed via the ART toolbox (https://www.nitrc.org/
projects/artifact_detect/)69 as timepoints for which there was (1) >2 mm composite
motion relative to the previous timepoint or (2) a ﬂuctuation in global signal that
exceeded a threshold of three s.d. from the mean global signal. Participants were
dropped if one-third or more of the timepoints collected were identiﬁed as artifact
timepoints; this resulted in dropping ﬁve child participants from the sample (see
Participants). Number of artifact timepoints differed signiﬁcantly between child
and adult participants (Child (n= 122): M(s.d.)= 10.5(10.6), Adult (n= 33): M(s.
d.)= 2.8(4), Welch two-sample t-test: t(137.7)= 6.49, p < .000001). Among
children, number of motion artifact timepoints was not correlated with age
(spearman correlation test (n= 122): rs(120)= .02, p= .86) or ToM score (kendall
tau correlation test (n= 122): rk(120)=−.005, p= .94). Number of artifact
timepoints did not differ between young (3–5-year old) children based on false-
belief task performance (linear regression tests for effect of FB-Group on number
of motion artifact timepoints: NS effect of FB-group (Pass (n= 30) vs. Fail (n=
15)): b=−.04, t=−.12, p= .9; NS effect of FB-group (Pass (n= 30), Inc (n= 20),
or Fail (n= 15)): b < .05, p > .9) or response inhibition (linear regression test for
effect of DCCS on number of motion artifact timepoints (n= 64): NS effect of
DCCS summary score: b= .16, t= 1.18, p= .25). See Supplementary Fig. 8 for
visualization of the amount of motion per age group. Despite amount of motion
being matched across children, and therefore likely not driving developmental
effects within the child sample, we include number of motion artifact timepoints as
a covariate in all analyses. Number of artifact timepoints is highly correlated with
measures of mean translation, rotation, and distance (r > .8). Because this measure
is not normally distributed, spearman correlations were used when including
amount of motion as a covariate in partial correlations.
Region of interest (ROI) analyses were conducted using group ROIs. ToM and
pain matrix group ROIs were created in an independent group of adults (n= 20),
scanned by Evelina Fedorenko and colleagues. These data were preprocessed and
analyzed with procedures identical to those used for participants in the current
study. Reverse correlation analyses were conducted in this separate group of adults,
using 10 mm group ROIs surrounding peaks reported in previous publications
(ToM regions70; Pain matrix71). Seven ToM and nine pain events were identiﬁed
(ToM: 60 s total, M(s.d.) length: 8.6(4.6)s, Pain: 66 s total, M(s.d.) length: 7.3(4.4)s).
We subsequently used a general-linear model to analyze BOLD activity of these
participants as a function of condition, using these events. Second-level random
effects analyses were used to examine the group-level response to Mental > Pain
and Pain >Mental (p < .001, k= 10, uncorrected). We then drew 9mm spheres
surrounding the peak activation in each region, to create new group ROIs that were
tailored to the stimulus, but deﬁned in an independent sample of adults (see
Supplementary Fig. 1 and Supplementary Table 2 for more information on all
group ROIs, and Supplementary Fig. 7 for details of the convergence between
events across the two adult samples and ROIs).
All timecourse analyses were conducted by extracting the preprocessed
timecourse from each voxel per group ROI. We applied nearest neighbor
interpolation over artifact timepoints (for methodological considerations on
interpolating over artifacts before applying temporal ﬁlters, see refs 72,73), and
regressed out two kinds of nuisance covariates to reduce the inﬂuence of motion
artifacts: (1) motion artifact timepoints; and (2) ﬁve principle component analysis
(PCA)-based noise regressors generated using CompCor within individual subject
white matter masks74. White matter masks were eroded by two voxels in each
direction, in order to avoid partial voluming with cortex. CompCor regressors were
deﬁned using scrubbed data (e.g., artifact timepoints were identiﬁed and
interpolated over prior to running CompCor).
For inter-region correlation analyses only, we additionally regressed out the raw
timecourse extracted from bilateral primary motor cortex (M1). Primary motor
cortex ROIs were 10 mm spheres drawn around peak coordinates generated with
Neurosynth (http://neurosynth.org/; search term: “primary motor,” forward
inference from 273 studies; coordinates: [38,−24,58], [−38,−20,58]). These ROIs
are included in the expanded inter-region correlation analysis shown in
Supplementary Fig. 4; the bilateral M1 timecourse was not regressed out for this
supplemental analysis. However, because this analysis showed that the within-M1
inter-region correlation increases with age among children, we regressed the
bilateral M1 timecourse from the ToM and Pain timecourses for the inter-region
correlation analyses reported in the main text, to ensure that the age effects in the
ToM and pain networks are above and beyond developmental effects present in
regions like primary motor cortex, and that within-network correlations are not
falsely inﬂated by commonalities in signal ﬂuctuation across the brain.
The residual timecourses were then high-pass ﬁltered with a cutoff of 100 s.
Timecourses from all voxels within an ROI were averaged, creating one timecourse
per group ROI, and artifact timepoints were subsequently excluded (NaNed).
In inter-region correlation analyses, each ROI timecourse was correlated with
every other ROI’s timecourse, per subject, and these correlation values were
Fisher z-transformed. Within-ToM correlations were the average correlation
from each ToM ROI to every other ToM ROI, within-Pain correlations were the
average correlation from each Pain ROI to every other Pain ROI, and across-
network correlations were the average correlation from each ToM ROI to each
Pain ROI. This procedure is similar to that used by ref. 42. In order to test for
developmental change in within-network and across-network correlations, we
conducted linear regressions to test for (1) signiﬁcant differences between adults
and children, in regressions that included group (child vs. adult) and number of
artifact timepoints as predictors, (2) signiﬁcant effects of age (as a continuous
variable), ToM performance, and number of artifact timepoints among children,
and (3) signiﬁcant group differences between children who pass and fail explicit
false-belief tasks, including number of artifact timepoints and age as predictors.
In order to test whether ToM and pain networks are coherent and specialized
early in childhood, we used t-tests to compare within-network versus across-
network correlations in 3-year-old children (n= 17). Within-network and
across-network correlation measures were normally distributed (p > .22, one-
sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests), and variance in within-ToM, within-Pain,
and across-network correlations did not differ across children and adults, or
false-belief passers vs. failers (F-tests to compare two variances: children (n=
122) vs. adults (n= 33): F(32,121) > 1.1, p > .66; pass (n= 30) vs. fail (n= 15): F
(14,29) > .78, p > .65).
Initial reverse correlation analyses were conducted on adult participants only.
Each ROI timecourse was z-normalized, and timecourses within each network were
averaged across ROIs, resulting in one timecourse for face regions, ToM regions,
and the pain matrix per adult participant. Except for the ﬁrst 10 timepoints (5 TRs
rest, followed by 5 TRs of the movie introduction (Disney castle and Pixar logos)),
the residual signal values across adult subjects for each timepoint were tested
against baseline (0) using a one-tailed t-test. This procedure is similar to that used
by41. Events were deﬁned as two or more consecutive signiﬁcantly positive
timepoints within each network. Events were rank-ordered according to the
average magnitude of response to the peak timepoint in adults, and labeled
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according to the ordering (e.g., event T01 is the ToM event that evoked the highest
magnitude of response in the ToM network).
In adults, we conducted an overlap analysis to determine whether the number
of timepoints labeled as both ToM and pain events was statistically fewer than
would occur by chance. We constructed 1000 permutations of ToM and pain
timecourses, which had the same number and duration of events. The constructed
timecourses were 158 TRs in length (the experiment was 168 TRs; the ﬁrst 10 TRs
were excluded from the reverse correlation analysis because the movie started on
TR 11). For each permutation, we randomly scrambled the order of ToM and pain
events. We then ﬁlled in the timepoints between events with zeros, with a random
proportion of zeros between events such that the total number of zeros was equal to
the total number of non-event timepoints in the original timecourses (ToM: 125
TRs; Pain: 116 TRs). Events within a timecourse (ToM or Pain) necessarily had to
be separated by at least one timepoint, since they would otherwise be counted as a
single event. The ﬁrst event of each timecourse could be preceded by zero zeros,
and the last event of each timecourse could be followed by zero zeros. We
calculated the sum of the number of timepoints tagged as ToM and pain events in
each pair of permutations (ToM and pain timecourses), and subsequently
calculated the proportion of permutations that resulted in the same or a smaller
amount of overlap as observed in the reverse correlation analysis.
In order to test for developmental effects in the magnitude of response to ToM
and pain events, we deﬁned a peak timepoint per event as the timepoint with the
highest average signal value in adults, and tested for signiﬁcant correlations
between the magnitude of response at peak timepoints and age (as a continuous
variable), including amount of motion (number of artifact timepoints) as a
covariate. Because this measure of motion is non-normally distributed, we
employed spearman correlations. For ToM regions only, we used linear regressions
to test for a signiﬁcant relationship between peak magnitude of response and
theory of mind behavior (overall, in all children), and to test whether responses at
peak timepoints differed between children who pass (n= 30) and fail (n= 15)
explicit false-belief tasks. Response magnitude at all peak events was normally
distributed (all p > .23, one-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test). Response
magnitudes showed similar variance across false-belief task passers (n= 30) and
failers (n= 15) (F-tests to compare two variances: all F(13,28) > .7, p > .07), with
the exception of one event (T03: F(14,28)= .30, p= .02). A permutation test was
used to test for group differences in magnitude of response to this event75. We ran
the reverse correlation analysis in 3-year-old participants only (n= 17), in order to
examine response speciﬁcity at this young age, and to better understand
developmental differences.
Finally, we tested whether the functional maturity of each child’s timecourse
responses (i.e., similarity to adults) was related to the inter-region network
correlations. We calculated the pearson correlation between each child’s ToM
timecourse (averaged across ROIs) and the average adult ToM timecourse; we
similarly calculated the pearson correlation between each child’s pain matrix
timecourse and the average adult pain matrix timecourse. The timecourses used for
this analysis were the same as those used for the reverse correlation analysis, prior
to z-normalization (TRs 11:168). We tested whether, across children, this measure
of functional maturity per network was correlated with within-network and across-
network inter-region correlations, or related to ToM behavior. The neural maturity
measure was normally distributed in both networks (p > .29, one-sample
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test). Variance in this measure in the ToM network did not
differ between children who pass (n= 30) and fail (n= 15) false-belief tasks (F test
to compare two variances: F(14,29) > 1.00, p > .95). We additionally calculated and
report the pearson correlation between the average timecourse of children in each
age group and the average adult timecourse.
All of the analyses reported in this manuscript should be considered
exploratory, not conﬁrmatory, in that the analyses described here were not chosen
prior to data collection, and data collection was not completed with this speciﬁc set
of analyses in mind. While we deliberately chose this stimulus in order to measure
neural responses in very young children (ages 3–4 years), older children visited the
lab to participate in a different study, and additionally completed the protocol of
the current study. We then recognized the opportunity of analyzing the full cross-
sectional dataset, and chose analyses based on the stimulus (time series analyses
seemed to utilize more data and be more sensitive than previous analysis
methods38), and on recent relevant progress in the ﬁeld42,76,77.
Behavioral battery. After the scan, all children completed a behavioral task battery
including (in order) an explicit theory of mind battery and a measure of nonverbal
IQ (under 5 years: WPPSI block design78, over 5 years: nonverbal KBIT-II79).
Children under age seven then completed a computerized version of the Dimen-
sional Change Card Sort task as a measuring of response inhibition. Performance
on DCCS was captured using the summary score44; one child (an inconsistent FB
task performer) failed to complete the DCCS task.
Explicit ToM task and false-belief composite score. All children completed a
custom-made explicit ToM battery21 (https://osf.io/G5ZPV/), which involved lis-
tening to an experimenter tell a story and answering prediction and explanation
questions that required reasoning about the mental states of the characters. Because
this task was designed to capture variability in ToM reasoning across a wide age-
range of children, the questions varied in difﬁculty. Easier items involved reasoning
about similar and diverse desires, true beliefs, and emotion prediction; harder items
included reasoning about false beliefs, moral blame-worthiness, and second-order
false beliefs. Two analogous booklets were used; children ages 3–4 and 10–12 years
old listened to a story about students ﬁnding snacks, and 5-year-old children
listened to a story about students ﬁnding books; 7–9 year-old-children were split
among the books (snacks: n= 16; books: n= 33). Different booklets were used
across children because children of different ages participated in different studies
that all involved the current protocol. However, the two booklets were designed for
repeated measures designs: analogous stories and questions across the two booklets
had identical syntax, but different semantic content: one story was about helping
children ﬁnd their books, the other was about ﬁnding snacks. A previous study
using the ‘ﬁnding books’ booklet suggests the validity of this task to capture theory
of mind development in children ages 5–12 years old21. These booklet tasks and
instructions are available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/G5ZPV/;
DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/G5ZPV; ARK: c7605/osf.io/g5zpv).
Each child’s performance on the ToM battery was summarized as the
proportion of questions answered correctly, out of 24 matched items (14 prediction
items and 10 explanation items). An additional two control items were asked to
ensure that children were paying attention; after ensuring all children answered
these questions correctly, these items were not further analyzed. Children ages 3–5
years old were also categorized based on their performance on a false-belief
composite score based on six explicit false-belief questions (4 prediction, 2
explanation) within the ToM booklet. These six questions were chosen because
they were canonical explicit false-belief questions describing changes in location or
unexpected contents11,12,80. The composite score demonstrated acceptable
reliability (Cronbach’s α= .71). Children were categorized as explicit false-belief
‘passers’ if they answered ﬁve or six out of six false-belief questions correct,
‘inconsistent performers’ if they answered three or four questions correct, and
‘failers’ if they answered zero to two questions correct.
We tested for signiﬁcant correlations between age, DCCS and ToM, and for
differences in these scores between children who pass and fail false-belief tasks. We
used Kendall’s rank correlation tau, given non-normal distributions of the ToM
score (Shapiro–Wilk normality test: w= .9, p < .00001) and DCCS score (w= .75,
p < .00001), and given the frequency of ties in both of these measures.
Code availability. The analysis code used to generate the ﬁndings of this study is
available from the corresponding author upon request.
Data availability. The fMRI and behavioral data collected and analyzed during the
current study are available through the OpenfMRI project (https://openfmri.org/;
Link: https://www.openfmri.org/dataset/ds000228/ DOI: 10.5072/FK2V69GD88).
The ToM behavioral battery is additionally available through OSF (https://osf.io/
G5ZPV/; DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/G5ZPV; ARK: c7605/osf.io/g5zpv). The corre-
sponding author welcomes any additional requests for materials or data.
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